COMMENTARY
Normansfield: Vacuum of management in the NHS RUDOLF 
KLEIN
Perhaps the most extraordinary, and certainly the most disquieting, revelation offered by the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Normansfield Hospital' is that of a breakdown in the NHS's system of management. The vocabulary of management-with its emphasis on monitoring and accountability-is shown to have been empty, incantatory rhetoric devoid of substance. The report convincingly demonstrates that if the situation at Normansfield had indeed been monitored effectively, if there had been a determination to make those concerned accountable for their actions and policies, the explosion which precipitated the inquiry would never have happened. Some of the circumstances leading to the crisis were indeed unique to Normansfield, while others derive from the special problems inherent in caring for the mentally handicapped. But many of the more fundamental weaknesses in the system of management follow, as I shall try to show, a pattern already evident in previous inquiries. The report therefore has some uncomfortable implications which go beyond this particular case-or indeed the field of mental handicap-and which are highly relevant for any future changes in the NHS's organisation.
The strike which prompted the inquiry occurred in May 1976. This is when the nursing staff walked out, deserting their patients, so as to draw attention to their grievances against the consultant psychiatrist, Dr Terence Lawlor. But this was no sudden or unpredictable eruption, but rather the culmination of a long chain of events. The fact that the situation at Normansfield had turned sour-and that the quality of patient care had deteriorated scandalously as a result-had long been known at all levels of the NHS's hierarchy of management. If ever there was a preventable explosion this was it: to sum up the message of the report, this was the story of a train approaching a precipice with everybody concerned sitting on their hands, hoping that the worst would not happen.
The report sets out some of the main incidents in the history of Normansfield. As early as 1972, Dr Lawlor was interviewed by "three wise men," following disagreements between him and some of his medical colleagues. Their conclusion was that ' 'there has been a breakdown of the normal professional relationship." In 1974 there followed a spate of resignations from the staff, a letter from the community health council to the area health authority expressing concern about standards of treatment, and a complaint from the chief nursing officer at Normansfield about Dr Lawlor's "interference in nursing matters"-so signalling the breakdown of the relationship between the consultant and the nursing staff which was at the root of much of the trouble. The same year a member of the regional health authority, Dr Ivan Clout, visited the hospital and, alarmed by what he saw, described it as a "time bomb." In 1975 the CHC repeated its concern, further evidence of ill feeling between Dr Lawlor and the nursing staff was drawn to the attention of the AHA team of officers, and evidence of poor conditions continued to accumulate. In particular, a nursing officer from the DHSS reported, after visiting the hospital, "I was greatly concerned that management was failing in its duty The report is scathing about many of the individual officers concerned at the different management levels. In particular, the medical, nursing, and administrative members of the AMT come under criticism; only the treasurer is explicitly exempted. Of one medical member, the report says that his "advocacy of a policy of inactivity was in large part responsible for the underlying failure of the area management team as a whole to deal with the problems of Dr Lawler." Of another, it says "he appeared by nature cautious, pedantic and defensive his philosophy was one of non-involvement." Furthermore, these comments are in addition to the well-publicised conclusion that the area administrator "is not competent to hold the very responsible post he occupies." Indeed, this inquiry's report is unprecedented in its comprehensive willingness to recommend the dismissal of various members of staff whose performance was, in the view of the inquiry committee's members, inadequate.
One possible conclusion to draw from all this is that Kingston and Richmond AHA was singularly unfortunate in the quality of staff that it attracted: that, by some mischance, it managed to recruit a disproportionate number of rather passive administrators, medical, nursing, and lay. If so, no general conclusions for the NHS as a whole can be drawn from the report about the quality of management. But the Normansfield Report is not the first to be critical of the way in which area teams of officers work. In the case of the inquiry into the affairs of Solihull AHA2 the report found that the team had "completely and irremediably broken down" because of quarrels among its members. In the case of the inquiry into the affairs of Rochdale AHA the report criticised the effectiveness of the team, although making no criticism of individual members. So, while it is impossible to assess the general quality of NHS management on the basis of the Normansfield inquiry, it cannot be dismissed entirely as an eccentric, totally atypical instance.
"Consensus management did not work" Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between the quality of individual managers and the effect of the environment in which they work. In his foreword to the report, Mr David Ennals, Secretary of State for Social Services, cites Normansfield as showing that, in this particular instance, "the present system of consensus management did not work effectively." But it is possible to derive an even more serious criticism from the report. Conceivably passivity may be the occupational disease of consensus team members: in other words, unanimity may be easiest to achieve when the decision is to do nothing. Moreover, one interpretation of the Normansfield saga could be that when everyone is responsible for all decisions, no one feels any particular obligation to take the lead in assuming responsibility for handling any particular problem. Avoidance of confrontations may become the dominant philosophy. Once again, it would be a mistake to generalise too recklessly from the case of Normansfield, but at the very least it carrics a warning that-irrespective of the quality of individual managers-the present system may be biased towards encouraging passivity, until action becomes inevitable in a crisis situation, rather than pre-emptive action and the assumption of positive leadership.
More specifically, the Sherrard inquiry criticises the handling by both regional and area officers of the events immediately before the strike in May 1976. No one emerges well from this episode. The report documents "a series of blunders" by officers of the Confederation of Health Service Employees, some of whom are described as "coarse opportunists who embraced the discontent as an ally in demonstrating their trade union muscle." Similarly, the health authorities ignored a series of warning signals. In particular, the area managemcnt tcam "adopted an approach which was both casual and complacent," so leaving the nursing staff "with the impression that their complaints were not being taken seriously or Unfortunately, unlike the divorce courts the NHS does not appear to have adequate machinery for dealing with this kind of breakdown. The Health Services authorities can seek to dismiss unsatisfactory employees but they lack procedures for moving people from one job to another without inflicting major hurts on them. A mistake once made, in terms of fitting people to jobs appropriate to their abilities, tends to become permanent. In contrast, the Civil Service, while offering at least as much security as the NHS, has considerable scope for moving people around. When I once professed my amazement at the promotion of an obviously incompetent administrator to an undersecretaryship I was gently told that he could do far less damage in his new post than in his previous one.
NHS as a national employer?
One conclusion to draw from this might be that the NHS should move towards being a national employer: that consultants, administrators, nurses, and others should be employed not by a particular health authority but by the NHS. In short, they should be guaranteed a particular kind of job, not life occupancy of a specific post. In such circumstances, it would be relatively easy and much less painful to prevent more Normansfield-or Solihull-type breakdowns from arising by moving the people concerned. The case for such a change may be especially strong in the particular circumstances of mental handicap hospitals, where professional isolation may reinforce the problems that stem from personality clashes. But there would be obvious attractions about increasing the opportunities for mobility more generally in a period of slow expansion, when life occupancy can all too easily also become a life sentence to what may become an increasingly stale routine. I am tempted to argue that no consultant-or university professor for that matter-should hold his or her post for more than 10 years before moving on. There are obvious problems about such a proposal-for example, the costs (social as much as financial) of moving. Nevertheless, in the absence of policies designed to encourage flexibility and mobility the NHS may increasingly suffer from what is already one of the ills of British society: a sclerotic caste system based not so much on social classes but on occupational categories granting job rights.
The final conclusion for national policy which I draw from the Normansfield Report is less clear-cut and rather more in the nature of a perplexed question about the scope for "democratic" control in the NHS. The discussion so far, reflecting the balance of the report, has been mainly about the roles of service providers and administrative officers at different levels. But the chain of accountability for the services provided to the public, for which the Secretary of State is answerable to Parliament, runs through the area health authority. The area management team is accountable to the members of the authority, while, in turn, the authority is collectively accountable for all the services provided to the RHA. In turn, the RHA is accountable to the Secretary of State. So, if the buck for what happened at Normansfield stops anywhere, it is with the members of Kingston and Richmond AHA. It is the AHA which "is responsible for the state of affairs we find to have existed at Normansfield," in the words of the report. In the event, the members of the AHA did not-so far as can be judged from the report-play any part whatsoever in the history of Normansfield. Here was the real vacuum in the management of the NHS. They failed to monitor the activities of their team of officers; they seem to have ignored the warning noises coming from the CHC and other quarters. The report prints, deadpan, the following exchange during the hearings with the chairman of the AHA (who was not reappointed when his term of office expired in 1977): "Q. Do you think that the area management team handled the Normansfield situation in a way that is beyond criticism between 1974 and March 1976 ? A. Yes, I do."
Not an isolated instance
What makes the failure of Kingston and Richmond AHA so disquieting is that, once again, this is not an isolated instance. Indeed, it has a long lineage. As long ago as 1969 the report on the Committee of Inquiry into conditions at Ely6 -which first drew attention to the plight of hospitals for the mentally handicapped-criticised the hospital management committee for not playing a more active part. Similar criticisms were made by the Farleigh7 and Whittingham8 inquiries. One reason for this, the Ely report argued, was that HMC members found it difficult to combine the role of consumer representatives with that of management. Whether or not as a direct result of this argument, the 1974 reorganisation separated the representative and managerial tasks, the former going to CHCs, and the latter being allocated to the AHAs. But the available evidence hardly suggests that AHAs are more effective than HMCs. The Liverpool inquiry4 showed that authority members had a poor attendance record and showed a lack of interest in the major problem facing the area-industrial relations. The Rochdale inquiry3 concluded that "the area health authority and the chairman of the authority must, as a matter of urgency, take steps to provide the degree of leadership which their staff-and the public-are entitled to expect from them." Indeed, in the long list of inquiries which span the period both before and after the 1974 reorganisation it is difficult to find a single instance where the members of the relevant HMCs or authorities emerge with credit.
It may be argued that, by definition, those authorities which are the subject of inquiries will be unrepresentative. Indeed, it would be quite wrong to conclude that the failures revealed at Normansfield and elsewhere are general. The Any move towards a more decentralised NHS will largely depend on whether or not it is possible to devise answers to such questions and so to develop a more effective system of accountability than that shown by the Normansfield inquiry. For, while doubts remain about the effectiveness of the members of authorities, the DHSS will inevitably, and probably rightly, continue to insist on exercising a close control over what happens at the coalface of the NHS.
